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Abstract 
Contracting in expeditionary operations is not a new phenomenon.  What is 
new is the scope and magnitude that contracting and contractors play in today’s 
military operations.  Even if global operating tempos decline, many experts believe 
that reliance on contractor personnel will remain at current levels, or even grow, in 
relation to the number of uniformed personnel.  
Lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to 
loss of efficiencies, lack of effectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud of the 
executing participants.  The authors propose adopting an Integrated Planner and 
Executor (IPE) and embrace mandates for Operational Contract Support, including 
generating a thoroughly vetted Annex W into OPLANs.  The authors contend that 
the best means to accomplish integration into existing war planning systems is by 
congressionally mandating, authorizing, and funding (via appropriation) the IPE 
positions at the flag and senior executive service (SES) levels within Service 
structures, such as at the JCASO.  The authors recommend that JCASO have more 
authority within GCC and Service staffs—particularly to establish, monitor, and 
manage Annex W for GCC and the Services within the APEX framework. These 
recommendations will allow for greater efficiency and effectiveness in providing 
contracted support to all military operations.   
Keywords: Contingency Contracting, Expeditionary Contracting, 
Humanitarian Aid, Disaster Relief, Advanced Planning, Three-tier Model, YTTM, 
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I. Introduction 
A. Military Stands to Gain From Newest Initiatives in Doctrine  
Military organizations throughout the world are increasingly called to perform 
functions and create outcomes that are reliant on contractor support.   In fact, 
contractors perform myriad functions in modern, often complex, military operations.  
Additionally, there is increased scrutiny on militaries to become better stewards of 
scarce resources, to eliminate potential waste, and to reduce abuse of taxpayer 
money due to poor management, operational redundancy and duplication of effort, 
and outright corruption.  Because of an increased reliance on contractors and recent 
demands for improved accountability and performance, the authors contend that 
international military organizations will benefit by incorporating Phase Zero 
Contracting Operations (PZCO), strategic and integrative planning, for contingency 
and expeditionary operations.  The PZCO concept has gained high-level attention 
recently, as the concept is embedded in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation 
Planning (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2011), published in August 
2011, and in Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008), 
published in October 2008, and currently under revision.  Additionally, PZCO 
protocols were proposed and published in 2010, and the concept has gained 
popularity among military leaders seeking to improve military capability while 
following sound business practices (Yoder, 2010).  
In this paper, the authors present the PZCO concept for strategic leaders and 
planners.   The PZCO concept is presented to include the scope and magnitude of 
current and future contractor support, the need for integration and coordination 
amongst stakeholders, key PZCO model constructs, and alignment with key aspects 
of the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX), which must include 
contracting.  Finally, the authors present conclusions and recommendations for 
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B. The Scope and Magnitude of Contractor Support in 
Expeditionary Operations 
Contracting in expeditionary operations is not a new phenomenon.  What is 
new is the scope and magnitude that contracting and contractors play in today’s 
military operations.  For example, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), in 
March 2011, reported that in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, the ratio of 
contractors to uniformed personnel supporting operations was at 1.23 uniformed 
military per contractor represented (Schwartz & Swain, 2011).  Even if global 
operating tempos decline, many experts believe that reliance on contractor 
personnel will remain at current levels, or even grow, in relation to the number of 
uniformed personnel.  The New York Times reported in February 2012 that 113,491 
contractor personnel were in Afghanistan compared to 90,000 U.S. soldiers 
(Nordland, 2012).   
It is the scope and variety of contracted functions that is particularly 
noteworthy.   These functions include base operation support (BOS), weapon 
system support, security services, and a host of others.  For example, DynCorp 
International (DynCorp; 2011), recently advertised the following job opportunities in 
government and industry publications:   
LOGCAP work opportunities includes many support roles such as: 
Construction Engineers and Superintendents, Project Controls, Project 
Managers, Quality Assurance Specialists, Site Managers, HSE Managers, 
Logistics Support, Supply Assignments, Security Jobs, Firefighting 
Opportunities, Laundry Service, Food Services Support, Water Works, Vector 
Control Sanitation Jobs, Billeting Positions, Transportation/Logistic Managers, 
Heavy Truck Drivers, Crane operators, Ware House workers, Aviation, Forklift 
Operator, Chemical Engineer, Electrical Engineer, Construction Engineer, 
Mechanical Engineering, Supply Chain Manager, Senior Safety Management, 
Maintenance Jobs, and Power Generation Support. (DynCorp, 2011)  
C. High Reliance on Contracted Support Has Created Challenges 
Based on continued public and political pressure to keep organic uniform 
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operations is not likely to wane.  But, high reliance has also created challenges for 
military planners, operators, contracting units, and even for the contractors 
themselves.  Challenges have manifested in command and control, in integration 
into Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) battle and operational schema, and in 
the need for advanced planning, phasing, and timing of contracting events to 
synchronize with and complement operations plan (OPLANs).  Additionally, 
consideration must be made in regards to communications and movement plans, 
weapons control, compliance with host nation and status of forces agreements 
(SOFA), contract management and oversight, indemnity and insurance of 
government-contracted personnel, prevention of human trafficking, third-country 
national (TCN) labor protections, issuing and maintaining security clearances, and 
law suits under the Defense Base Act, to name only a few.  Many of the challenges 
stem from a shift in organic uniformed-force capability to a contracted capability—
from “doing” to “managing.”  So what can military leaders and planners do to 
effectively and efficiently manage all of these aspects of contracted support?  The 
incorporation of Phase Zero Contracting Operations—PZCO—into the design and 
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II. Phase Zero Operations: The Three-Tier Model 
A. Credentialed Contract Planners Integrated With Operations 
Planners 
The Three-tier Model (TTM) was published to address the challenges 
inherent in contracting in complex military operations (Yoder, 2004).  The TTM is a 
credential-based personnel hierarchy for contracting officers and planning staff that 
optimizes the integrative planning, coordination, and execution required for 
contingency and expeditionary operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels of the organization.  The model is based on two primary premises: First, 
mission optimization occurs only with well-credentialed contracting planners and 
executors.  Second, optimized stakeholder integration, including, for example, 
operational commanders, supporting units, and NGOs and PVOs, can only be 
accomplished by utilizing well-credentialed participants in the planning and 
execution phases (Yoder, 2011).   
The three-tier model has specific personnel credentials in three primary 
areas: (1) training and education, (2) certification (such as Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act–Defense Acquisition University contracting levels, 
security clearance requirements, etc.), and (3) experience.  The three tiers are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
Tier One—The ordering officer at Tier One serves at the lowest level.  This 
contracting level has several identifying attributes. Tier One personnel reside within 
the tactical level of the military hierarchy and are the most prevalent contracting 
personnel within most formal military and civilian organizations.  Tier One personnel 
are junior civilians and military staff.  They operate at the tactical and unit levels and, 
as such, perform no integrative planning at the operational and strategic levels.  Tier 
One personnel place basic orders and conduct simple transactions. In the broadest 
terms, there is little stakeholder integration being initiated or managed at this level.  
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majority of “in-the-field” contracting actions are conducted.  As this is the tactical 
level of the enterprise, particular importance at Tier One is placed on standardized 
training—emphasizing protocols, ethical conduct, management, control, and 
oversight.    
Tier Two—In the middle of the hierarchy is Tier Two—the leveraging 
contracting officer (LCO) who serves at the operational level.  Tier Two personnel 
require enhanced credentials.  These personnel conduct complex contracting 
transactions and leverage local economy assets.  They may perform all functions of 
Tier One personnel, but with increased credentials, scope, and responsibilities.  The 
TTM calls for Tier Two personnel to be mid-level civilians, mid-grade officers, or 
credentialed senior enlisted.  They can be integrated into planning and local 
operations—performing some integrative planning at the tactical and operational 
levels—and they can perform some liaison functions with broader stakeholders.  
Their main mission is to optimize local operations in harmony with strategic 
guidance.  Since Tier Two personnel serve at the operational level of the 
organization, expertise in the protocols, ethical conduct, management, control and 
oversight, conduct of complex negotiations, broad business acumen in complex 
military contracting, and phase I Joint Professional Military Education (JPME I) are 
required. Currently, the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Acquisition 
University offer Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) CON 234 
Contingency Contracting and CON 334 Advanced Contingency Contracting courses 
to standardize education in the contingency contracting business field. 
Tier Three—The highest and most crucial tier in the TTM is Tier Three—the 
integrated planner and executor (IPE).  This tier is at the strategic level of military 
and civilian organizations.  The IPE is a flag officer or senior civilian position. It calls 
for the highest credentials to include, but not be limited to, Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME I & II), Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
Contracting Level III certification and warrant (or international equivalent), a 
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operations and contracting gained through experiential tours or assignments (Yoder, 
2010). Figure 1 highlights the key aspects of the IPE position (Yoder, 2011).  
 
Figure 1. TTM—Tier Three—Integrated Planner & Executor 
(Yoder, 2010) 
The IPE must be strategically positioned within the organization to achieve 
the highest levels of integrative planning.  The IPE’s primary mission is creating and 
validating a comprehensive contracting plan, Annex W, to complement all elements 
of the OPLAN.  Ideally, the IPE position should be placed within the Joint Staff, at 
GCC-COCOM, and at the highest operational and planning staffs within each 
Service branch.    
The IPE will create and validate the Operational Contract Support (OCS) 
Plan, Annex W, in all key geographic combatant command (GCC) CONPLANs and 
OPLANs. (Specific content elements of Annex W are presented later in this paper.)  
Because of the complexity and magnitude of the tasks involved in creating and 
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expertise in key strategic and analytical areas, such as OPLAN analysis, logistics 
assessments, contracting, and similar professional disciplines.   
Of note, most organizations do not have a dedicated contracting IPE (by any 
moniker) within their organizational structure. Traditionally, the joint logistics (J-4) 
organizations have embedded contracting officers.  However, the contracting 
positions within J-4, or within traditional logistics organizations, have been utilized as 
adjunct positions to the broader logistics functional planning.  Additionally, the 
relatively low military rank and lack of seniority of the contracting personnel on J-4 
staffs often lack both the credential and the clout to effectively execute the 
requirements proposed for the IPE.  
Despite the DoD Service components lacking an IPE at the strategic level, the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA, 2008) has made significant 
impact at addressing credentialed personnel shortfalls at the strategic level.  The 
NDAA 2008 authorized and established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support 
Office, JCASO, directed by a military one-star.  JCASO has a staff of 49 personnel 
expressly to provide IPE strategic-level assistance in providing contract support to 
GCCs.  According to Admiral Ron J. MacLaren (2012), Director, JCASO, each GCC 
is allocated two specialists from JCASO to assist in the development and exercise of 
key OPLAN Annex W’s.  These JCASO specialists work with GCC planning staffs to 
incorporate essential contracting plans at the GCC.     
Will the DoD and the military Service components embrace the TTM and 
particularly the IPE function established by the NDAA 2008 as the JCASO? 
Currently, JCASO has not been empowered to compel GCC or the Service 
components to utilize their operational contract support development functions.  
Rather, it is an advisory group that must “sell” its capabilities to improve mission 
support through integrative planning (MacLaren, 2012).  Only time and sound metric 
analysis will prove whether or not the JCASO is effective at creating the needed 
Annex W, Operational Contract Support Plans, mandated and needed for key GCC 
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What specifically will the IPE position accomplish—what, exactly, will the IPE 
achieve?  If the warfighters are to embrace operational contract support, they must 
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III. Phase Zero—Planning, Exercise, and Rehearsal  
Phase Zero, generally known in GCC planning arenas as the shaping phase, 
is adopted by the operational contract support contracting community as the 
planning and exercising phase.  Traditional military jargon defines Phase Zero as 
“shaping.”  The authors contend that Phase Zero contracting in the integrative 
strategic planning arena is the advance planning, exercising, and rehearsal of robust 
contracting support plans designed to complement the GCC’s deliberate and 
contingency planning process.  Realistically, the contracting community and the 
warfighter have the same vision for Phase Zero—get the plans in place then 
rehearse, validate, and update them to reflect current realities.  In essence, Phase 
Zero contract planning, and the creation of OPLAN Annex W, became mandatory 
under the 2008 Defense Authorization Act (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2011).  The authorization and supporting guidance under Joint Publication 4-10—
Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008)—requires all GCCs to create Annex W 
for OPLANS, representing the embodiment of Phase Zero integrative planning.  
However, despite the mandate, what is particularly disconcerting is that the GAO 
recently determined that only four out of 39 OPLANS requiring comprehensive 
Annex W integration plans actually had them (GAO, 2011).  Admiral MacLaren 
(2012), Director, JCASO, indicates that there is significant work ahead to get all the 
GCC OPLAN Annex W support plans in place and exercised.  The authors contend 
that current operational tempos, along with constrained budgets, may preclude 
achieving fully integrated exercises and rehearsals for all OPLANs, as these 
rehearsals can carry a huge price tag.  However, failure to exercise and rehearse, 
based on recent and well-documented problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, results in 
costs that far outweigh the up-front costs to fully vet Annex W plans.  Deliberate 
planning and contingency planning are different—the first is not necessarily time 
sensitive, but the second is very time sensitive and often constrained.   While 
JCASO has assigned two specialists at each GCC to assist in creating and 
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be responsible for providing actual contract support and must be included in the 
planning, exercise, rehearsal, and execution of the OPLAN.   Sound strategy 
requires the exercise and rehearsal of Annex Ws in the most critical OPLANs with 
the personnel that will ultimately be called into action.  
Ideally, each OPLAN and CONPLAN will have an Annex W, fully drafted, 
exercised, rehearsed, analyzed and revised.  The doctrinal framework published in 
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, along with Joint Publication 4-10, 
Operational Contract Support (OCS), is key for the design and integration of 
contracting into OPLANs.   The objective is to embed and synchronize the OCS plan 
with all elements of the OPLAN to meet the commander’s intent. Properly 
constructed Annex W plans must include elements such as, but not limited to, 
personnel/organizational structures and authorities; business protocols, including 
special statutory and regulatory provisions under declared contingencies; scheme of 
operations; synchronization with the battle plan; oversight; management and 
auditing; personnel regulations and provisions; spend analysis integration; 
synchronization with broader strategic objectives; and metrics for assessment of the 
efficiencies and effectiveness of embedded plans and actions (Yoder, 2011). 
To ensure the efficacy of the integrated Annex W plan, the IPE must act as a 
strategic liaison with key stakeholders.  Analytical assessments of the Annex W plan 
may utilize strength, weakness, opportunity, threat (SWOT) and capability gap 
analysis techniques.  The SWOT method allows the IPE to evaluate the strengths, 
weaknesses/limitations, opportunities, and threats, and, ultimately, the potential 
efficacy of the OPLAN’s integrated contracting plan. The capability gap analysis 
determines the support and provisioning gaps in the OPLAN that may be addressed 
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IV. Contracting Phases—Complementing Warfighter 
Strategy 
Contracting plans in Annex W, must be established, orchestrated and 
synchronized with the broader OPLAN strategy.  Since the NDAA of 2008, 
contracting has utilized five phases.  Phase Zero is the planning, exercise, and 
rehearsal phase.  Phase One is deployment.  Phase Two is build-up.  Phase Three 
is sustainment.  Phase Four is termination and redeployment (Yoder, 2010; Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 2010).   
The conduct of the GCC deliberate planning process is visualized in six 
phases, as expressed in Joint Publication 5-0 (CJCS, 2011).  Phase Zero is the 
shaping phase, inclusive of normal and routine military activities as well as the 
development of theater campaign plans.  These campaign plans include shaping 
operations: activities intended to promote international legitimacy and cooperation 
with friends and allies, while dissuading adversaries.  GCCs also develop AOR 
contributions to various global campaign plans.  Phase I is deterrence—
demonstrating capabilities and resolve of the joint force in response to an 
adversary’s undesirable actions. Phase II is seize initiative—executing offensive 
operations.  Phase III is the dominate phase—breaking the enemy’s will.  Phase IV 
is the stabilize phase—required when there is no fully functional legitimate civil 
governing authority, and joint forces must perform limited local governance and 
other activities to allow for a restoration of stability and a new normalcy.  Phase V is 
the last phase, enable civil authority—providing joint support to legitimate civil 
governance in theater.  Figure 2 shows the notional warfighter phases (CJCS, 
2011).  
Department of Defense Directive 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and 
Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its 
Operational Execution mandates the coordination and synchronization of contracting 
with broader warfighter OPLANs (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
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Figure 2. Warfighter’s Notional Operational Plan Phases 
(CJCS, 2011) 
The planning that takes place in Phase Zero, for both warfighters and 
contracting, must be designed to support all phases of the operation plan.  Each 
phase will have its unique contracting challenges, dependent on the specific 
elements of the OPLAN and situation in theater.   
As Figure 3 represents, the contracting community must plan and execute its 
mission in five phases, with the overarching Phase Zero occurring on a continuous 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 25 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 


















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 27 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
V. Phase Zero and Mandatory Pillars for Strategic 
Contracting Integration  
As defined previously, Phase Zero is the planning, exercising, and rehearsal 
phase of military operations—properly establishing and vetting the contracting plan 
prior to an actual event or crisis.  In order to function effectively within the 
established and existing military deliberate and contingency planning framework, the 
IPE and associated functions must be designed within three main pillars—personnel, 
platforms, and protocols.  Failure to integrate contracting with all of the three primary 
pillars will result in sub-optimization or outright contract support and/or mission 
failure (Yoder, 2010).   
The first pillar—personnel— should be addressed by implementing the TTM 
and particularly the IPE.  The second pillar—platforms—is addressed by integrating 
contracting throughout all phases of military operations and into the existing 
warfighters’ platforms for planning and execution, the Adaptive Planning and 
Execution System, or APEX (which is in the process of replacing the JOPES 
system).  Additionally, it must be embedded with other APEX-complementary 
platforms, such as the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) system. The 
third pillar—protocols—represents the existing or desirable set of rules and 
procedures, including sound business, planning, and military doctrine, that govern 
the planning and execution of the contracting plan within the broader OPLAN. Figure 
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Figure 4. Mandatory Pillars for Integrative Success 
Protocols include, but are not limited to, the strategic planning guidance 
established by the GCC; strategic purchasing guidance and mandates; Joint 
Publications 4-10 (Operational Contract Support; CJCS, 2008), 5-0 (Joint 
Operational Planning; CJCS, 2010), 4-0 (Joint Logistics; CJCS, 2008); and other 
doctrinal publications, along with the mandates for constructing and implementing 
Annex W for each unique OPLAN.  Additionally, acquisition-and-contracting-specific 
laws, regulations, and guidance must be utilized including, but not limited to, the 
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VI. IPE Within Joint Strategic Planning, APEX Products, 
and Annex W 
Joint strategic planning products include, but are not limited to, GCC 
estimates, base plans, concept plans, operational plans, warning orders, planning 
orders, alert orders, operation orders, execute orders, fragmentary orders, and 
deployment orders, along with all annexes including the newly mandated Annex W—
the Operational Contract Support Plan.  These products are alien to most 
contracting and acquisition professionals, because, traditionally, contracting and 
acquisition personnel have not played a key role in the production or management of 
these critical documents.  In fact, as stated previously, the GAO recently conducted 
an audit of 39 OPLANS that required an integrated Annex W and found only four 
had been produced (GAO, 2011).   
It is clear, given the defined content of Annex W, that contracting at the 
strategic IPE level must be included in all phases of planning and in the production 
of key APEX products.  Annex W must include all of the key elements for mission 
success and address the three mandatory pillars for integrative success—personnel, 
platforms, and protocols. The integrated Annex W must include, at a minimum, those 
elements deemed essential for mission accomplishment, while addressing cost and 
affordability within the overall OPLAN.  The contents include, but are not limited to, 
the following list:  
 Mission statement—from the OPLAN or OPORD; 
 Primary and secondary customers; 
 Anticipated requirements (in relative time-phase); 
 Forces deploying in sequence and duration; 
 Operational locations; 
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 Organization structure (HCA, Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB), 
etc.);  
 Supported and supporting relationships; 
 Command and control relationships; 
 Procedures for appointing, training, and employing FOOs (field 
ordering officers), CORs (contacting officer representatives), 
disbursing agents, GPC (Government Purchase Card) holders; 
 Procedures for defining, validating, processing, and satisfying 
customer requirements; 
 Procedures for budgeting receipt of supplies/services and payments to 
vendors; 
 Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment; 
 Supplies and services anticipated locally, local customs, laws, taxes, 
SOFAs, host nation support, Acquisition Cross Service Agreements 
(ACSAs), vendor base, etc.; 
 Infrastructure, office location, security measures, kits, etc.; 
 Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor 
personnel; 
 Standards of support—processing times, turn-around-time, PALT, and 
reporting; 
 Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions, special 
authorities, and programs;   
 Relief in place/transfer of authority; 
 Contractor restrictions (movement, basing, etc., time-phase specific); 
 Guidance on transferring LOGCAP support to theater support 
contracts by function and/or phase of the operation;    
 Special authorities and programs (CERP–COIN); 
 Post-contract award actions (management, closeout, de-obligation, 
etc.); 
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 Mandated solicitation and contract provisions; and 
 Human trafficking mandates, indemnity, and MEJA provisions. (Yoder, 
2010) 
Without a comprehensive planning capability, most missions will be 
negatively affected.  It is clear that the IPE, properly positioned within the planning 
community, can better create and assess the Annex W capabilities within the three 
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VII. Conclusions 
To date, contracting has not been fully integrated into military planning and 
execution.  Some significant strides have been made to better assimilate contracting 
at the strategic level, including Jacques Gansler’s report (2007), Urgent Reform 
Required, and the recently published doctrine contained in Joint Publication 4-10—
Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008).  However, despite the push towards 
better integration, including the newly formed JCASO, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) still lacks a manifest comprehensive planning and executing capability, as 
evidenced most recently in the final report of the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA; 2011).  
The lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level 
leads to loss of efficiencies, lack of effectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud 
of the executing participants as highlighted in the CWCIA’s report (2011).  The 
functions of the IPE and mandates for Operational Contract Support, including 
generating a thoroughly vetted Annex W, are so massive that the Services have 
recently contracted out, or outsourced, some of the requirement (Yoder, 2011).  
However, outsourcing this critical function may only make matters worse, in that key 
decisions will be left in the purview of non-government personnel—including 
decisions of further contracting, along with other possible conflicts of interest and 
potential for corruption.    
The authors contend that the best means to accomplish integration into 
existing war planning systems is by congressionally mandating, authorizing, and 
funding (via appropriation) the IPE positions at the flag and senior executive service 
(SES) levels within Service structures, such as at the JCASO.  The authors 
recommend that JCASO have more authority within GCC and Service staffs—
particularly to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W for GCC and the Services 
within the APEX framework.  This will require greater engagement authorities than 
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represents the level of bona fide commitment to solve a long-standing problem that, 
without correction, will continue to fester and plague service chiefs, military 
commanders, Congress, and taxpayers.  Implementing Phase Zero Contract 
Operations (PZCO) planning through sound public policy, congressional 
authorization and funding, and the Services’ commitment to fully integrate 
contracting within the three pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols—is the 
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